By 14 October, Liquid Swords had sold 151,900 copies of its debut game Samson and booked SEK 24.1 million — about $2.4 million — in revenue. Five days later the Swedish studio filed for bankruptcy and dismissed all 27 staff.
Liquid Swords entered bankruptcy on 19 October 2026 after employees went two months without pay; the Swedish state wage guarantee covers arrears. Administrator Cirio has published a preliminary bidding document, all 27 staff are dismissed, and the bidding window closes on 21 October. Founder Christofer Sundberg co-founded Avalanche; NetEase took an undisclosed minority stake in 2022. Samson shipped in April with 151,900 copies sold. Verified against public reporting and compiled by the GameHub news desk.
Three numbers in the bankruptcy filing
Cirio's preliminary bidding document is blunt about the commercial result: 151,900 units of Samson sold as of 14 October 2026, SEK 24.1 million in revenue, roughly $2.4 million.
The same document carries a second figure: 27. That is the entire headcount, dismissed in full.
The arithmetic nobody survives
Divide $2.4 million across 151,900 copies and you get about $15.80 per unit. That is net of platform cuts and regional discounts, not the sticker price.
Samson is an AA-scale open-world action game with a development cycle close to six years. Swedish labour costs sit at the high end of Europe, and 27 people across six years of salaries, social contributions, outsourcing and office space is an eight-figure dollar bill.
Six figures in, eight figures out. That is the whole equation.
Six years from Avalanche co-founder to bankruptcy administrator
Sundberg left Avalanche Studios, which he had co-founded, and set up Liquid Swords in 2020. The industry read it as the standard script: a proven creative director going independent.
In 2022, NetEase bought an undisclosed minority stake. Chinese publishers were shopping European studios in that window, and deals like this were treated as proof that funding had arrived.
Samson shipped in April 2026. In February 2025 the studio had already cut staff once, framed as being "for the studio's long-term sustainability."
Swedish business outlet Breakit later reported an "acute liquidity shortage." Sundberg's line to Breakit was: "I don't think it can be resolved."
In October, employees petitioned for bankruptcy after two months without pay. The state wage guarantee stepped in — Sweden's last line of defence.
What is actually for sale, and the 21 October deadline
Bankruptcy does not delete the game. The assets listed for sale are specific: the intellectual property tied to Samson, the company's other IP, development assets, equipment and inventory.
The bidding window closes on 21 October. Any buyer has days, not weeks, for due diligence.
Who bids for a finished world
For a buyer, this is a discount purchase of a completed setting plus a working toolchain. For NetEase, it is a stake that has to be revalued — minority equity in a bankruptcy rarely converts into control or priority recovery.
For the 27 staff, the answer is simpler: contracts do not transfer with the business, so any new owner has to sign each person individually.
Why "it sold okay" is no longer enough: the AA middle is disappearing
151,900 copies was a strong result a decade ago. In 2026 it does not buy survival.
The middle is being squeezed from both ends. Above, AAA budgets and marketing rates are affordable only to the largest publishers. Below, independent teams of two or three ship hits on completely different cost structures. AA sits in between: 20 to 40 people, open-world ambition, competing for the same attention while charging neither AAA prices nor indie costs.
150,000 copies was a hit in 2015, below the line in 2026
This is not one studio's problem. Among European and North American studios that closed or cut deeply over the past two years, AA-scale teams dominate. The pattern is consistent: decent reviews, unremarkable but real sales, and a cost base that ran away during an inflation cycle.
The bear case: this is not a simple publisher-villain story
The easiest narrative blames the platform cut or the publisher. A 30% storefront fee is genuinely heavy, but the heavier line in this ledger is time.
A six-year cycle means the market a team modelled at greenlight had already turned by launch. Between 2020's AA expectations and 2026's actual sales sit a hardware price shock, a subscription shift and a redistribution of player attention.
There is also a structural point about investment: NetEase's money arrived, but minority equity is not an unlimited backstop. Once liquidity tightened, the question was whether to keep funding the next project — a confidence call, not a sentimental one.
My read: this will not be the last
Liquid Swords is not an accident. It is a textbook AA failure for 2026: 150,000 copies sold, a strategic investor on the cap table, a founder with a name. All three cards played, and the company still did not survive.
The number worth keeping is that $15.80. It marks the arrival of a market where one unit sold no longer pays for one unit made. The next studio to fall will most likely do so with a sales chart that looks fine.
When did you last pay full price for an AA game? If a studio you loved needed 150,000 copies to survive, would you pay $10 more? Tell us below. More industry and studio coverage is at gghubs.com.
FAQ
Will Liquid Swords keep making games?
The company is in bankruptcy with all 27 staff dismissed and assets for sale. If a buyer takes the IP before 21 October, Samson may continue; the team itself would have to be rebuilt on new contracts.
Can I still buy Samson?
Yes. Liquidation does not affect sales of a game already on sale, and Samson remains available on its existing storefronts. Whether updates continue depends on the bidding outcome.
Why did 150,000 copies not cover costs?
The administrator reports 151,900 units generating about $2.4 million, or roughly $15.80 each. Development across 27 people and nearly six years runs into eight figures, so revenue covered less than half of payroll alone.